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COMMENTS
THE DEATH PENALTY: A CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
by Nathan L. Hecht
To some extent the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution1
now forbids the taking of life as punishment for crime. A stronger claim
is difficult. Abolitionists, on the one hand, may argue that the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Furman v. Georgid constitutes an absolute prohibition of
capital punishment. Retentionists, on the other hand, may repose hope in the
restriction of the holding to the facts of the three cases presented, the ambiguity
and dissension in the nine separate opinions, and the imminent likelihood of
change in the Court's membership. The judiciary faces the compounded difficulty of interpreting an ambiguous interpretation of a seldom used provision
of the Constitution.! State executives may feel the need to resolve the question
of what to do with the present residents of death rows. Some legislatures have
already abolished the death penalty by statute,4 but others are now forced to
reevaluate their penological systems, and, where convinced of the wisdom and
efficacy of capital punishment, to devise statutes that will pass constitutional
muster. The Court's decision is simple enough to those now facing the threat
of the death penalty: they will not be executed. But to those who must deal
with the decision in a working legal context it is anything but simple.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the holding and effects of the
death penalty decision. Essential to such an examination is a review in Part I
of the historical development of the basis of the decision, the constitutional
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments, both as to the clause itself and
as to previous interpretations by the United States Supreme Court. Of particular note is the California case examined in Part II, People v. Anderson,"
in which capital punishment was first declared absolutely to be a cruel or unusual punishment. Since it closely resembles Furman and is cited therein,' the
California case, unlike other state and lower federal court decisions, is treated
specially in this Comment. Part III analyzes the opinions handed down in
1 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
2408 U.S. 238 (1972).
' See Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REv. 996 (1964). In Furman the Court may have
added to rather than detracted from this predicament.
4
Nine states have abolished the death penalty by statute: Alaska (1957); Hawaii
(1957); Iowa (1965); Maine (1887); Michigan (1963); Minnesota (1911); Oregon
(1963); West Virginia (1966); Wisconsin (1853). In addition, the five states of New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont have almost totally abolished
the death penalty, retaining it only for one or two heinous offenses and then rarely using it.
Brief for Petitioner at 5e, Aikens v. California, 407 U.S. 813 (1972). The California Supreme Court abolished the death penalty in that state. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,
493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). But see note 87 infra.
a6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
'One example is Justice Blackmun's comment: "The Court, in my view, is somewhat propelled toward its result by the interim decision of the California Supreme Court, with one
justice dissenting, that the death penalty is violative of that State's constitution." 408 U.S.
at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Furman in order to arrive at, as nearly as possible, the opinion of the Court.
In Part IV various implications of the decision are explored. Finally, Part V
sets forth several conclusions to be derived from the whole.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS"

A. The Original Meaning
The first appearance of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was in
the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The Bloody Assize, the Popish Plot, and
the abdication of James II served as catalysts of the Glorious Revolution of
1688. In 1689, with Parliament in control and William pressing a weak legal
claim to the throne, there existed a perfect opportunity for the people to speak
out against abridgments of their civil rights.: After reciting the circumstances
and before acknowledging William as King, "[Tlhe said Lords Spirituall and
Temporall and Commons... for the Vindicating and Asserting their auntient
Rights and Liberties, Declare... That excessive Baile ought not to be required
nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.""
One historian suggests that the use of the word "unusual" was mere chance.
According to him, a previous version of the Declaration at first used the word
"illegal" and later the phrase "illegal and cruel."9 The same historian also
suggests that the clause originally prohibited disproportionate penalties rather
than tortures, since tortures were prevalent long after the adoption of the
English Bill of Rights. Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Weems v. United
States,1 disagreed. He argued instead that the original prohibition was addressed
to the courts only and not to Parliament, and included no theory of proportionality, but attacked only those punishments which were unduly painful,
violent, and sanguinary. Whatever view is taken, it is clear that the English
Bill of Rights must be interpreted in its seventeenth century context, a context
only remotely relevant to problems in the twentieth century on another continent.
B. Migration to the United States
The cruel and unusual punishments clause first appeared in America when,
in 1776, the precise language of the English Bill of Rights was used in section
'See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
'An Act declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settleing the Succession
of the Crowne, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1688).
"'The final phraseology, especially the use of the word 'unusual,' must be laid simply
to chance and sloppy draftsmanship." Granucci, supra note 7, at 855. The recitation of
grievances prefacing the actual enumeration of the rights referred to the infliction of "illegal
and cruel punishments." Id. It is obvious that no adjective used was of particular significance
and that the prohibition was directed at a generally recognized class of punishments and
not only those punishments which were strictly cruel and/or unusual.
'0 Used in the context of the Titus Oates incident in which a rural minister was severely
punished for perjury in announcing the existence of a plot to assassinate the King of England, the proscription did not apply to the method of punishment at all. "In the context of
the Oates' case, 'cruel and unusual' seems to have meant a severe punishment unauthorized
by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose." Granucci, supra note 7,
at 859.
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U.S. 349, 382 (1910).
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9 of Virginia's Declaration of Rights." Whatever problems there may be in
interpreting the original meaning of the clause in England, there is little doubt
that it was used in this country to prevent the infliction of barbarous tortures
as punishment for crime." Unlike the situation existing under the English
monarchy which had prompted the enactment of a prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments, there was and is in this republic little likelihood of
an abuse of the power to prescribe punishments for crime. " Nevertheless, the
fear of such abuse was real in 1788.12
Like section 9 of the Virginia Constitution, the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution was taken directly from the English Bill of Rights. "
" Granucci, supra note 7, at 840. See 7 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONs
3813 (1909).
5
See 1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 694 (8th ed. 1927):
It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment declared by statute for an offense
which was punishable in the same way at the common law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense. And probably any
new statutory offense may be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted by the common law for offenses of similar nature. But those degrading
punishments which in any State had become obsolete before its existing constitution was adopted, we think may well be held forbidden by it as cruel
and unusual.
See also 2 T. CALVERT, THE CONSTITrrTION AND THE COURTS 520 (1924).
" "The provision [i.e., the eighth amendment] would seem to be wholly unnecessary
in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government
should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct. It was, however, adopted as an admonition to all departments of the national government, to warn them against such violent proceedings as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts." 2
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 650 (5th ed.
1891). During the debates on the federal constitution in New York, Mr. Livingston, referring to the potential in Congress to abuse the power granted to it, stated: "A changeable
assembly will be entirely incapable of conducting a system of mischief; they will meet with
obstacles and embarrassments on every side." 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 345-46 (2d
ed. 1901) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT).
'1 Mr. Holmes argued in the Massachusetts debates on the federal constitution:
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is the
consideration, that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine, what
kinds of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They
are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check
on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.
donot pretend to say Congress will do this; but, sir, I undertake to say
that Congress (according to the powers proposed to be given them by the
Constitution) may do it; and if they do not, it will be owing entirely-I
repeat it, it will be owing entirely-to the goodness of the men, and not in
the least degree owing to the goodness of the Constitution.
2 ELLIOT 111.

In the Virginia debates, Patrick Henry warned thus:
In the definition of crimes, I trust they [Congress) will be directed by what
wise representatives ought to be governed by. But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of
representatives. What says our bill of rights?-'that excessive bail ought not
to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' Are you not, therefore, now calling on those gentlemen who
are to compose Congress, to prescribe trials and define punishments without
this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights?
You let them loose; you do more-you depart from the genius of your
country.
3 ELLIOT 447.
16 The only change was from "ought not to be" to "shall not." See note 1 supra, and
text accompanying note 8 supra.
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According to Justice McKenna in Weems, "[t~he provision received very little
debate in Congress.""' Although the need for the clause was doubted, and its
effectiveness in dealing with the feared abuse slighted, Congress adopted it
almost as a matter of course as an expression of a fundamental right of American citizens, and the states ratified it with little or no discussion. " The clause
was, therefore, not regarded as an important substantive addition to the Constitution."
Thus, while the clause was not viewed by its American framers to have the
importance accorded it in England, at least the intent of the draftsmen was
clear. Despite the uncertainty of purpose surrounding the clause in the English
Bill of Rights, as part of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution it prohibited the infliction of tortures or other extraordinarily painful
punishments, and very little else. There was, however, one other important
difference: while the English Bill of Rights was forever bound to the context
of its enactment, the eighth amendment, as part of the vital foundation of a
changing society, could be molded to relate to that society.
C. Development in Subsequent Cases
The Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment was not applicable to
the states in Pervear v. Massachusetts."' The petitioner had been convicted of
the illegal sale of liquor and sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars and to be
imprisoned for three months at hard labor. Although the Court did not formally
reach the merits of petitioner's contention, Chief Justice Fuller did venture to
remark that the Court did not view petitioner's sentence as excessive, cruel,
or unusual."'
In Wilkerson v. Utah," however, the Court did apply the eighth amendment within the Utah Territory."' Petitioner's sentence of death before the
firing squad was upheld. In so holding the Court seemed to require that since
all punishments are cruel to some extent a punishment must be unnecessarily
cruel to violate the eighth amendment.'
11217 U.S. at 368. Mr. Smith of South Carolina voiced a brief objection to the indefiniteness of the clause. Moreover, "Mr. Livermore opposed the adoption of the clause
saying: 'The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have
no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary.'"
He questioned who would be the arbiters of cruel and unusual punishments and what
standard they would use. Id. at 369.
182 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 321-91 (1894).

11"(The cruel and unusual punishments clause was considered constitutional 'boilerplate.'" Granucci, supra note 7, at 840.
"72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866).
"Id. at 480.
"99 U.S. 130 (1879).
23 After an unfavorable decision by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, petitioner sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court as provided by Congress. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253. Congress had organized the territory
on Sept. 9, 1850, and had vested the legislative power and authority over the territory in
its Governor and legislature. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, 9 Stat. 453. ]Exercise of this
power could not be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Act
of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Star. 458.
24The Court acknowledged the difficulty in attempting precisely to define this constitutional provision but concluded that "it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture
... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment
to the Constitution." 99 U.S. at 136.
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In re Kemmler involved an attack on New York's use of electrocution as
an unusual punishment." As in Pervear, the Court denied application of the
eighth amendment to the states,"1 but also as in Pervear, the Court intimated
its approval of the sentence, in this case as being a more humane means of
execution than hanging. At the time electrocution was only slightly more novel
than electricity itself; but more than novelty was required for unusualness in
the constitutional sense. 8 As for constitutional cruelty, Chief Justice Fuller,
writing for a unanimous Court, remarked: "Punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
is something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.""9
In O'Neil v. Vermont'"petitioner, a citizen of New York, had been tried
and convicted in Vermont for the unlawful sale of liquor within its boundaries.
Found guilty of 307 separate offenses, he had been sentenced to pay a fine of
$6,140 and to be imprisoned for over fifty-four years. The Court again refused
to apply the eighth amendment to the states, although this time three Justices
dissented. Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Field argued that as an expression of a fundamental right of a United States citizen the eighth amendment
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment to prohibit disproportionate and excessive punishments.3' "The inhibition," said Justice Field,
"is directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned [i.e.,
tortures such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, and stretching of
limbs), but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity
are greatly disproportioned to the offense charged. The whole inhibition is
against that which is excessive ....
.""
This expanded interpretation was followed in Weems v. United States,'
in which the Court for the first time struck down a punishment as being cruel
and unusual."' Weems had been convicted in the Territory of the Philippines
- 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
As has already been indicated, the eighth amendment derives all of its language but
little of its meaning from the English Bill of Rights. See part I, section A supra. Even
though use of the word "unusual" in the latter may have been due to chance which carried
over in the text, the appearance of the word in the former cannot be so regarded under rules
of constitutional construction. It therefore provides a basis for constitutional adjudication.
27 It did, however, recognize as proper petitioner's argument based on the fourteenth
amendment. Petitioner had not argued that the eighth amendment applied to the states,
even through the fourteenth. He argued only that imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment by a state constituted an abridgment of the privileges and immunities clause and the
due process clause. The Court's adjudication of the merits of this argument in no way
amounts to an assertion that the eighth amendment applies even indirectly to the states,
despite the argument's close resemblance to the "ordered liberties" approach later adopted
by the Court. Only one year after Kemmler the Court reiterated that the first ten amendments
did not apply to the states and distinguished this claim from the fourteenth amendment
argument. McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891).
' 136 U.S. at 449.
"Id. at 447.
20 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
31
Id.at 363.
2 Id. at 339-40. The minority view seems to have been followed in Howard v. Fleming,
191 U.S. 126 (1903), even though in that case petitioner's ten-year sentence for conspiracy
to defraud was affirmed.
26

33217

U.S. 349 (1910).

'4Though the Court actually applied the prohibition found in the Philippine Bill of
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under a statute punishing the falsification of official documents by a public
official by a fine and cadena temporal. The latter punishment, of Spanish
origin, consisted of imprisonment from not less than twelve years and one day
to not more than twenty years at hard and painful labor, the prisoner always
to wear a chain at his ankle hanging from his waist. This imprisonment was
accompanied by the loss of certain civil rights, the perpetual disqualification
from the enjoyment of certain privileges, and the perpetual subjection to surveillance by the authorities with certain affirmative duties imposed." Weems'
actual sentence was 4,000 pesetas' and fifteen years imprisonment, both in
excess of the minimum required by statute. To deserve this punishment with
all its accoutrements Weems had falsified two documents relating to expenditures and pocketed 612 pesos.' The Court held this punishment to be cruelly
excessive and unusual in comparison with punishments authorized in the United
States for crimes seemingly of greater magnitude than the falsification here
involved.
Justice McKenna wrote of the eighth amendment provision itself:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They
are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are,
to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality
as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' The future is their care, and
provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can
be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.38
From this view of the eighth amendment Justices White and Holmes dissented, reciting the original meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" and
recommending adherence to it. " Weems made clear, however, that the dissenters represented a waning approach to the eighth amendment, one that was
giving ground to the new tests of unnecessary cruelty, disproportionality, and
excessiveness.
When the Court considered an eighth amendment question thirty-seven
years later' in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,41 it balked at expanding
Rights, the result would have been the same under the eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution since "the provision of the Philippine bill of rights, prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, was taken from the Constitution of the United
States and must have the same meaning." Id. at 367.
'The convict under this sentence lost all rights of parental and marital authority, along
with the right to administer property and to dispose of it inter vivos. He was barred from
holding office, voting, acquiring honors, collecting retirement pay, and enjoying in general
the benefits of citizenship. His perpetual surveillance resembled the American parole system
save that it was to last until he died. He was obligated to fix his domicile and notify the
authorities thereof, to secure employment, and to submit to inspection by the authorities at
any time. Id. at 366.
8
About $772 in 1950.
"7About $306 in 1950.
38217 U.S. at 373.
"Id. at 409-10.
"Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), and United States ex rel. Milwaukee
Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921), are passed over. In
the former Justice Holmes, then in the majority, wrote the Court's opinion upholding petitioner's concurrent sentences for mail fraud totalling thirty-five years imprisonment and a
fine of $7,000. Badders' argument on the eighth amendment was summarily rejected. In
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the meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" to include highly speculative
psychological pain. Francis had been sent to the electric chair for murder, but
due to a mechanical malfunction the attempted execution had failed. When
Louisiana proposed to try again, Francis objected on the ground that the second attempt would be cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment.
The majority held that were the amendment applicable to the states-a question expressly reserved--a second attempt would not involve such psychological strain as to render the punishment unconstitutionally cruel.4
If doubt remained as to the expansion of the eighth amendment beyond its
originally intended meaning, it was resolved in Trop v. Dulles." While stationed in French Morocco during World War II, petitioner had escaped for
two days from the stockade where he had been confined for breach of discipline. Captured and court-martialed for wartime desertion, he was sentenced
to three years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. Some years later he learned that in addition to this
punishment he had lost his citizenship.' In petitioning the Supreme Court
to declare his citizenship, he urged that expatriation as a punishment contravened the eighth amendment. Chief Justice Warren, joined by three other
Justices,' wrote: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man.""7 Standing upon this foundation as a
unitary prohibition, "The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""' Expatriation involves no physical pain. Instead it destroys the individual's political existence so that "the expatriate has lost the right to have
rights."' 9
Chief Justice Warren's opinion made clear that capital punishment, though
not in issue here, did not offend the new "evolving standards of decency"
test.' Seeing a paradox in this result, Justice Frankfurter was forced to ask in
the latter case dissenting Justice Brandeis suggested that the revocation of petitioner newspaper's second-class mail permit and the imposition of a fine of $150 each day subversive
material was printed, all in accordance with the provisions of the Espionage Act, was cruel
and unusual punishment. 255 U.S. at 435 (dissenting opinion). The majority made no
reference at all to Brandeis' contention. Neither case represents a significant development
in the interpretation of the eighth amendment.
4' 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
uId,at 462.
' The four dissenters would have remanded for additional facts before ruling on the
merits of the case. Id. at 472. Apparently, the uncertainty critical to the dissenters was
whether a current had passed through Francis. If so, the punishment lost its humane aspects
and became a shocking torture.

" 356 U.S.4 86 (1958).

4' Section
01 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Star. 1168, as amesded, 8 U.S.C.
1481 (a) (8) (1970), prescribed the loss of nationality for one convicted of wartime
desertion and dishonorably discharged.
"There was no majority on the eighth amendment issue. Justice Brennan joined the
Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker in striking down expatriation, but
on the grounds that Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority in requiring it
in this case. 356 U.S. at 114; see note 56 infra. The four dissenters, like the Chief Justice,
used the Weems approach, but they arrived at the opposite conclusion. 356 U.S. at 126-27.
"Id. at 100.
SId. at 101.
41 Id. at 102.

" The Chief Justice wrote, "At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as
an index of the constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against
capital punishment-and they are forceful-the death penalty has been employed through-
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his dissent: "Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be
seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?""1 But even
if expatriation is not worse than death, neither is the cadena temporal struck

down in Weems. For the Chief Justice, the standard was neither absolute
cruelty-necessarily all punishments have an element of cruelty-nor cruelty
as understood by the eighth amendment's framers. The standard derived from
the amendment as a whole was, rather, that advocated by the O'Neil dissenters:

the disproportionality and excessiveness of the punishment relative to the
crime in the context of contemporary society. Treason may thus be punished

by death, but the "crime" of having a cold may not be punished by even one

day's imprisonment."2
In relying on Weems, the Trop test almost completely ignores the specific
words "cruel and unusual punishment."' 3 Cruelty should be easily relatable to
society's mores, but the Chief Justice made no attempt to do so. Unusualness,
on the other hand, has no apparent relation to standards of decency, and the
Chief Justice found evidence of it in the fact that expatriation was a novel
punishment in the United States," an argument the Court had refused to
admit with regard to electrocution in Kemmler." Finally, as to punishment,
Frankfurter argued convincingly for the dissent, expressing the opinion of a
majority of the Court," that expatriation as used in this case was merely an
exercise of Congress' war power and not a punishment for crime within the
meaning of the eighth amendment.57 In refusing to acknowledge these problems
and, instead, relying on the overall thrust of the clause rather than the specific
words, the "evolving standards of decency" test represents an unprecedented
departure from traditional approaches to and interpretations of the eighth

amendment."
The particular nature of the crime rather than the punishment was emphasized in Robinson v. California." Under the "light of contemporary human
knowledge,"" a standard resembling the Trop test, petitioner's sentence to
ninety days imprisonment for his conviction of addiction to narcotic drugs was
seen to be violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.0 ' The majority
out our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate
concept of cruelty." Id. at 99.
the constitutional
*1Id.at 125.
52See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
1 "The Court recognized in that case that the words of the Amendment are not precise,
and that their scope is not static." 356 U.S. at 100-01.
"Id. at 101 n.32.
"5See note 28 supra, and accompanying text.
"Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion refused to treat petitioner's loss of citizenship
as a punishment but found it instead to be "beyond the power of Congress to enact." 356
U.S. at 114. He sided with the dissenters on this issue but joined the majority as to disposition57of the case. See note 46 supra.
Id. at 124-25.
" Weems provides no support for this position. Concededly the Weems Court looked
beyond the original meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments." But it did so with an eye
toward relating the broadened interpretation to the actual text. Of the punishment it said:
"It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character." 217 U.S. at 377. See also Goldberg & Dershowitz,
Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1784-91 (1970).
59370

U.S. 660 (1962).

oId. at 666.

65 Significantly,

the Court for the first time made the eighth amendment applicable to
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seemed to say that if the behavior in question was not properly classified as
criminal then no punishment could be constitutionally inflicted, regardless of
the nature of that punishment. This interpretation of Robinson was confirmed
by the Court six years later in Powell v. Texas." The Robinson Court had
used the eighth amendment to open the door to the substantive criminal law,
but the Powell Court, after distinguishing the facts in Robinson, upheld a fine
of $50 for public drunkenness, thus leaving the door ajar but carefully guarded.
The Supreme Court did not apply the eighth amendment again until, in
Furman, it applied it for the first time to capital punishment.

II.

PEOPLE V. ANDERSON

A. The Trial and First Appeal
On the morning of April 18, 1965, Robert Page Anderson walked into a
pawnshop in San Diego, California, and asked to see a rifle. Although he had
less than two dollars cash in his pocket and a ring worth about ten dollars, he
agreed to purchase the rifle and a box of ammunition. While Swienty, one of
the two clerks, was totalling the bill, Anderson grabbed the ammunition and
quickly loaded the rifle. When Richards, the other salesman, told Anderson
he could have the rifle, Anderson turned and fired point blank at him, killing
him. Swienty quickly ran upstairs, and for the next several hours he hid under
a bed while Anderson fought a vicious gun battle with the police. Anderson
killed no one else before the police apprehended him.
A jury found Anderson guilty of first degree murder, attempted murder, and
first degree robbery. He was sentenced to die in California's gas chamber. On
automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court" Anderson unsuccessfully
argued that the trial court had erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
penalty phase" that they could be influenced by pity or sympathy. 5 The court
unanimously affirmed the sentence."
B. The Second Appeal
The court faced the nature of Anderson's punishment in his second appearance two years later," although the actual decision of the case turned on the
the states through the fourteenth amendment. By this time, however, such a decision came
as no great surprise. The groundwork for incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the fourteenth amendment had been laid in varying degrees in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937), and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
62392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
63
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1970).
" In the case of first degree murder the punishment may, in the discretion of the trial
court or jury, be death or life imprisonment; the sentence is to be determined at a separate
proceeding after the defendant has been found guilty. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190, 190.1
(West
1970).
"5 People v. Anderson, 64 Cal. 2d 633, 414 P.2d 366, 51 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1966). On the
guilt issue the jury was instructed not to be moved by pity or sympathy. On the penalty
issue the court simply instructed the jury that they were governed by its previous instructions
only to the extent that they were applicable to the penalty phase of the trial. The supreme
court held that the latter instructions did not effectively prohibit the jury from being properly
influenced by any pity or sympathy.
6"Justice Peters dissented from the denial of rehearing. Id. at 639, 414 P.2d at 372, 51
Cal. 7Rptr. at 244.
' Anderson petitioned for habeas corpus. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117,
73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968).
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United States Supreme Court's then recent ruling in Witherspoon v. Illinois."'
Anderson claimed that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se. He
argued that punishment, especially when it deprives a person of the fundamental right to life, must be closely related to a compelling state interest, and
that the state could show no such interest. Amid curiae argued further that
the penalty caused tremendous psychological pain, indeed that it often drove
men on death row insane, so as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
After applying the provisions of both the California and United States constitutions,"9 four of the seven justices came to the conclusion that the death
penalty was not per se unconstitutional."0 They pointed to the continued wide
acceptance of capital punishment and specifically approved the use of California's gas chamber. They rejected the argument that excessive psychological
pain was involved, pointing to the failure of a similar contention in a previous
case.' Finally, they refused to enter the area of penology, leaving to the
legislature the question of whether the death penalty should ever be imposed.
But Anderson also argued that the death penalty as applied to him was
unconstitutional. The basis of this argument was that the determination of
death upon the sentencing court's or jury's exercise of absolute and standardless discretion was arbitrary and blind to extenuating circumstances, thus
placing the penalty so inflicted within the category of cruel and unusual
punishments."' The same four justices disagreed, arguing that if the legislature
had the authority to prescribe the punishment at all it had the authority to
vest discretionary power of determination in the trier of fact. Chief Justice
Traynor and Justices Tobriner and Peters dissented on the ground that the
potential abuse of discretion by the trier of fact rendered the California procedure unconstitutional."5 They carefully avoided the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty per se.
C. The Third Appeal: The Death Penalty Decision
Upon remand for resentencing, Anderson again received the death penalty.
Although the constitutionality of capital punishment both per se and as ap" 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Witherspoon held "that a sentence of death cannot be carried
out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause
simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious
or religious scruples against its infliction." Id. at 522.
9CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 6 contains a prohibition similar to that in the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted."
70 Justice Burke, writing on behalf of Justices Mosk and Sullivan, discussed the issue at
length. Justice McComb concurred in a separate opinion. Justice Mosk was extremely reluctant on the basis of personal beliefs to join in upholding the death penalty but concluded
in a separate opinion, "As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and not as I
might fervently wish it to be." 69 Cal. 2d at 628, 447 P.2d at 132, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
"' People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 498-99, 341 P.2d 679, 698-99, cert. denied, 361
U.S. 925 (1959), petition for rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 941 (1960).
72CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1970) states, "The determination of the penalty
of life imprisonment or death shall be in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue
of fact on the evidence presented ....

" No guidelines for or restrictions on the exercise of

discretion are established in the statute.
7369 Cal. 2d at 628, 447 P.2d at 132, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 36. In addition to the potential
evil of abuse of power, these three justices pointed out that the absence of standards for determining the sentence made it impossible for the defense to prepare its evidence or the

appellate court to determine what evidence the sentencer had used.
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plied to him had previously been determined, Anderson was entitled to raise
the issue once again on his second automatic appeal to the California Supreme
Court.'4 Noting that Aikens v. California was pending decision before the
United States Supreme Court7' and apparently not wanting to pre-empt the
High Court, the California Supreme Court struck down the death penalty
solely on the basis of the state's constitution and without reference to the
federal constitution."
The opinion of the near-unanimous court began by emphasizing the California constitution's disjunctive prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments."
The use of "or" rather than "and," it was claimed, was specifically intended by
the framers and not accidental.' As evidence of this claim the court pointed to
the fact that a majority of the constitutions used as models by the California
framers in their deliberations also employed the disjunctive."
Fortunately, this distinction was not determinative of the question for the
court. In the end the court relied on judicial rules of construction of constitutional provisions: "We may not presume, as respondent would have us do, that
the framers of the California Constitution chose the disjunctive form 'haphazardly,' nor may we assume that they intended that it be accorded any but
its ordinary meaning."8 Regardless of the history of the provision, then, the
language of the provision was clear, and on that the court placed ultimate
reliance. Since the Anderson court found that all previous cases involving the
death penalty either failed to discern the either-or meaning of article I, section
6, or were based primarily on the United States Constitution's eighth amendment, it did not feel bound by their decisions. Neither did the court recognize
a ratification of the death penalty in incidental references in the constitution
or statutory prescriptions by the legislature. The stage was thus cleared for
presentation of the question as a matter of first impression.
In view of the foregoing it is clear that the only showing necessary to overturn capital punishment was that of unconstitutional cruelty. The court accepted the Trop test of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
74

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1970).
' The Court originally consolidated four cases involving the constitutionality of the
death penalty: Aikens v. California, Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch
v. Texas. 39 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. June 29, 1971). See note 88 infra, and accompanying
text.
766 Cal. 3d at 634 n.1, 493 P.2d at 883 n.1, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.1.
77 CAL. CONST. art. 1, S 6.
786 Cal. 3d at 637, 493 P.2d at 886, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
Apparently to substantiate its interpretation of the evidence, the court indicated that
there had been little or no debate on the use of "or" at the first constitutional convention.
"The reporter of the debates stated only that 'Article I of the constitution on the "Declaration
of Rights," was taken up, read the third time, a few verbal errors corrected, and then passed.' "
6 Cal. 3d at 635, 493 P.2d at 884, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 156, citing BROWNE, DEBATES IN THE
CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA 30 (1850). It would seem, however, that this latter fact
detracts from rather than adds to the court's argument. It is possible that the total lack of
debate might indicate unanimity on the part of the drafters, but a much more likely implication of this absence of debate would seem to be a corresponding absence of any deliberation over the use of the disjunctive. If, as was urged by the court, there was in fact no discussion of the language of the provision, then the framers probably relied merely on the
phrasing of the other constitutions available to them, never really considering the possible
arguments for or against such phrasing.
806 Cal. 3d at 637, 493 P.2d at 886, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
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of a maturing society."" It rejected popular polls, statutes, and jury decisions
as indicia of the public acceptance of the death penalty, and instead emphasized the dehumanizing "1000 days" wait between sentencing and execution."
The court argued that this wait necessarily involved a brutalizing psychological
torture, much worse than any physical pain, which abjures the basic dignity of
man. The effect of this torture is compounded by the fact that it is unnecessary
to any penological policy the state might have. 3 On the basis of these considerations the court found the death penalty to be unconstitutionally cruel.
Although this showing of cruelty was alone sufficient to strike down capital
punishment, the court proceeded to discuss the unusualness of the punishment.
Finding the penalty to be little used both nationally and internationally, the
court held it to be "an unusual punishment among civilized nations."" It is
difficult to imagine how a punishment that has enjoyed widespread acceptance
at all times throughout history could, in the space of fifty or sixty years, become unusual in any ordinary sense of the word and still be in common use
in over half the countries of the world. Moreover, a head count of nations
would seem to be hardly a more reliable indication of the acceptance of capital
punishment than the popular polls and statutory affirmations rejected by the
court, especially in view of the uncertainty of evidence with regard to international abolition."5 The court, however, accepted the evidence offered without
question as prima facie proof of the unconstitutional unusualness of capital
punishment.
This all seems even stranger when it is remembered that no showing of
unusualness was necessary once cruelty had been established. The court's unwillingness to repose confidence in any one argument and its reliance instead
on the additive result of several indicates the legal shakiness of them all. This
is especially true in view of the fact that only two years before three of the
six justices comprising the majority here upheld the same punishment in the
same case." But regardless of the obscurity of the reasoning, the decision itself
1Id. at 648, 493 P.2d at 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165.

"I/d. at 648-50, 493 P.2d at 893-95, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165-67.
83The four penological objectives recognized by the court are retribution, rehabilitation,
isolation, and deterrence. The use of punishment solely for retribution was barred in California in In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 948, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965). Execution
is in no way rehabilitative, nor does the grave isolate much more effectively than a prison
cell. The court found evidence of the deterrent effect of capital punishment lacking. 6
Cal. 3d at 651-53, 493 P.2d at 895-97, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167-69.

46 Cal. 3d at 656, 493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171.

capital
forty nations have abolished
sa The court cited several sources as evidence that
4
4
punishment. Id. at 655 n.44, 493 P.2d at 898 n.4 , 100 Cal. Rptr. at 170 n. 4. Less than
two months following the decision the New York Times reported a United Nations survey
which indicated, on the basis of replies from sixty-nine member nations, that only nineteen
nations have abolished de jure capital punishment either totally or except in exceptional circumstances. In addition, two nations which did not respond and two non-member nations
were added to the list. Three others were reported to have abolished de facto the death
penalty. The paper also stated that the study indicated that only four governments had joined
the ranks of the abolitionists in the last twenty-five years. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1972, at 8,
col. 1. While this latter survey is probably not as reliable as the one on which the court
relied, the discrepancy between twenty-six nations and forty nations can hardly be attributed
solely to this probability or otherwise ignored. The fact of abolition in other countries is
difficult to ascertain precisely, and once ascertained to any reliable degree, it would seem to
be of questionable relevance to the issue as presented within any jurisdiction in the United
States.
"See part II, section B supra.
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was most clear, any suggestion of judicial fiat notwithstanding: capital punishment was unconstitutional in the State of California. "7
III. FURMAN V. GEORGIA
The United States Supreme Court consolidated four cases for oral argument:
Aikens v. California, Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v.
Texas. Aikens was later disposed of on other grounds.88 The cases presented to
the Court three men traditionally deserving of the death penalty."9 The punishment itself was on trial.
8 On appeal by the state of California, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
California v. Anderson, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). The Supreme Court later held the finality
of Anderson to have rendered Aikens v. California moot. 406 U.S. 813 (1972). While the
state and federal judiciary were thus in agreement as to the status of capital punishment in
California, the state's Governor refused to accept the decision as final. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1,
1972, at 46, col. 7. Although Anderson resulted in the release of California's condemned
men from the threat of death, the ultimate issue of whether and in what cases the legislature
could prescribe the death penalty for crimes was put to the people in the form of a referendum on an amendment to California's constitution in the general election on Nov. 7,
1972. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1972, at 37, col. 3. The people favored the amendment more
than two-to-one, thus reinstating the death penalty as far as the California constitution is
concerned. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1972, at 28, col. 1. The amendment states:
All statutes of this state in effect on February 17, 1972, requiring, authorizing, imposing, or relating to the death penalty are in full force and effect,
subject to legislative amendment or repeal by statute, initiative or referendum. The death penalty provided for under those statutes shall not be deemed
to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within
the meaning of Article 1, Section 6, nor shall such punishment for such
offenses be deemed to contravene any other provision of this Constitution.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1972, at 63, col. 1. Subsequent to the placing of this proposition on
the state ballot and prior to its passage, the California Supreme Court held that if passed
it would have no retroactive effect, i.e., it would not subject to the death penalty any persons
found guilty of a crime committed prior to the November passage of the amendment. White
v. Brown, 468 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1972).
88406 U.S. 813 (1972).
" While breaking into a house in Savannah, Georgia, twenty-six-year-old Negro William
Henry Furman was surprised by the owner of the house, a twenty-nine-year-old Caucasian
father of five children. Furman quickly retreated into the early-morning darkness, slamming
the door behind him. As he fled, he turned and fired his .22 caliber pistol at the closed door.
The bullet pierced the door and struck the owner of the house in the chest, killing him.
Brief for Petitioner at 2-6, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Tried for murder,
Furman received his death sentence from a jury which deliberated only one and one-half
hours. Under Georgia law the penalty for murder is death unless the jury shall recommend
and the judge, in his discretion, shall sentence to life imprisonment. Act of 1878-1879,
[1878-1879] Ga. Acts 60, as amended, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1972). This provision
was effective prior to July 1, 1969, and thus applied to Furman.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., a twenty-one-year-old Negro, accosted a physician's Caucasian wife
in her home as she tended her baby. Holding a pair of scissors to her throat, he threatened
her with physical harm if she should fail to give him all the money she had in the house.
During the search, while he was momentarily distracted, she grabbed the scissors and attempted to stab him. In the ensuing struggle Jackson recovered the scissors and pinned his
would-be assailant to the floor, promising death if she struggled further. He thereupon raped
her. The arrival of the maid frightened Jackson into escaping through an open window.
Throughout the entire ordeal the victim suffered neither serious physical injuries nor serious
or long-term psychological harm. Brief for Petitioner at 2-8, Jackson v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). A Georgia jury convicted Jackson of rape and sentenced him to die in the
electric chair. The jury might have recommended mercy, in which case the sentence would
have been life imprisonment; or it might have set the sentence at imprisonment for not less
than one nor more than twenty years. Act of 1866, [1866) Ga. Acts 151, as amended, GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972). This provision was effective prior to July 1, 1969, and
thus applied to Jackson.
Twenty-year-old Elmer Branch, a Negro, forced his way into a rural home one night,
awakened its occupant, a sixty-five-year-old Caucasian widow, and raped her. He demanded
money but received little; yet at no time prior to his departure did he threaten her with
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A. The Death Penalty Per Se
In a per curiam decision, the Court ruled that "the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments."9 The holding of
the Court was thus strictly limited to the circumstances of the cases presented.
Not so uniformly limited, however, were the separate opinions of the five
Justices who concurred in the Court's judgments. Justice Brennan declared:
"The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel and unusual,' and the States may
no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes." 1 With this statement Justice
Marshall agreed. Though expressive of a small minority's view, their arguments against the death penalty per se deserve review.
As has already been noted,"2 the question of the meaning to be accorded
the eighth amendment is not easily resolved. The English and American history of the language, "cruel and unusual punishments," is uncertain at best.
Likewise, the value of previous Supreme Court decisions as precedents may be
called into question. Unwilling to deal with these problems, Justice Brennan
maneuvered around them. He relied on neither history nor precedent for
authority, but instead found in the Trop "evolving standards of decency" test
a grant of carte blanche to constitutional arbiters to interpret and apply the
eighth amendment. Then, exercising his free hand, he stated the fundamental
principle underlying the eighth amendment proscription: "[A] punishment
must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.""
This degradation of human dignity would result if to any extent the punishment was either arbitrarily inflicted by the state, morally rejected by society,
or judicially declared excessive or unnecessary in light of modern penology.
For Justice Brennan, the infrequent infliction of the death penalty made "the
conclusion ... virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily." 4 This

infrequent infliction, together with the increasing public debate over the
morality of the punishment, implied societal rejection. Modern penological
goals made capital punishment unnecessary as a penal sanction and no longer
more effective than life imprisonment. Ultimately, inherent in the very nature
of capital punishment was the basic denial of the executed person's humanity.
The premises considered, Justice Brennan's conclusion was inescapable: "It
is a denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an
unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as
physical harm, nor did he ever seriously injure her. Brief for Petitioner at 3-5, Branch v.
Texas, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). A jury found him guilty of rape under Texas law and sentenced him to death. Death is not a mandatory punishment for rape in Texas. TEX. PEN.
CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1961).
Petitioner's counsel in Aikens described Aikens' murders, crimes as heinous as those in
the companion cases above, as "unmitigated atrocities." Brief for Petitioner at 3, Aikens
v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972). Without detracting from the abhorrent nature of the
other crimes described above, the characterization may perhaps be a bit strong when applied
to them. At least the happenstance of Furman's murder and the lack of serious injury to the
rape victims serve partially to mitigate the atrodties.
00408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). The original grant of certiorari had been limited to
this question. 403 U.S. 952 (1971).
91 408 U.S. at 305.
9
See part I supra.
93408 U.S. at 271.
"408 U.S. at 293.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic punishment. Under these principles and
this test, death is today a 'cruel and unusual' punishment."9
Justice Marshall shared many of Justice Brennan's objections to the death
penalty but emphasized historical derivation and case law development over
the more esoteric concepts of decency, dignity, and humanity. After a thorough
review of history and precedent, Justice Marshall determined the meaning of
"cruel" to be "torturous" and the meaning of "unusual" to be "out of the
ordinary."" Cruelty, however, as the case law points out, is a relative term
and involves a societal judgment as to the amount of pain inflicted. If that
pain level is excessive or unnecessary, then the punishment is cruel, regardless
of whether another age would have agreed. To Justice Marshall it was "immediately obvious, then, that since capital punishment is not a recent phenomenon, if it violates the Constitution, it does so because it is excessive or
unnecessary, or because it is abhorrent to currently existing moral values."9
After reviewing the possible reasons for the use of capital punishment, Justice
Marshall concluded that the infliction of the punishment violated the eighth
amendment. Only then did he analyze the sort of moral considerations that
concerned Justice Brennan, concluding: "Assuming knowledge of all the facts
presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would,
in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice. For this
reason alone capital punishment cannot stand."99
Justices Brennan and Marshall should perhaps be lauded for refusing to
hide behind legalistic euphemisms skirting the real issue and instead addressing
themselves to the moral problem presented, the merits of death as a punishment for crime. Unfortunately, moral considerations often have little to do
with the Constitution as a body of law and commend themselves, as the dissenters urged,99 to legislatures rather than courts. Justice Marshall disagreed:
"The point has now been reached at which deference to the legislature is
tantamount to abdication of our judicial roles as factfinders, judges, and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution."' " The effect of this serious invasion of
legislative province is consequential in its own right, in addition to the direct
blow struck at capital punishment.
B. The Death Penalty Imposed
While also concurring in the judgments of the Court, Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White refused to venture so far beyond the traditional boundaries
of judicial review... as their brothers, Brennan and Marshall.' Almost totally
at 286.
'"Id. at 330-31.
9
1Id. at 332-33.
99
1 d. at 369.
: See part III, section C infra.
19408 U.S. at 359.
191See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
10Justice Douglas wrote: "Whether a mandatory death penalty would otherwise be
constitutional is a question I do not reach." 408 U.S. at 257. Justice Stewart found it "unnecessary to reach the ultimate question" of whether the death penalty is ever constitutional.
Id. at 306. Justice White warned, "I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is un9Id.
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ignoring the moral aspects of the question and the various ramifications of
the word "cruel," they based their arguments on the unusual nature of the
death penalty as it is presently administered. The penalty itself with its long
history was unquestionably usual in the sense that it has always been an ordinary punishment for crime. What bothered Douglas, Stewart, and White was
that, in White's words, "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency
even for the most atrocious crimes and.., there is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not."'"3 The infrequency of its imposition made the penalty constitutionally unusual.
For Douglas, the problem was not that there was no basis at all, but rather
that the basis was discriminatory in violation of equal protection concepts. If
so, then "[ilt would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted
on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his
race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices."' ' Much ado had been
made by petitioners Jackson and Branch over statistics showing racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty by judges and juries who might
have imposed lesser sentences.'0 The emphasized statistics showed a clear trend
in rape cases for the death penalty to be imposed more frequently on black
rapists of white women than on white rapists.' 0' On the basis of this evidence
Justice Douglas found statutes to which the statistics applied to be unconstitutional: "They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an
ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is
implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."'' 7 The evidence did
not prove, and Justice Douglas did not claim, that the statutes had actually
conceived discrimination. The charged pregnancy may have been a bit premature; the statistics were not without their weaknesses. Evidence of discrimination in murder cases was even weaker. In any case, no actual discrimination
against any of the three petitioners was claimed or proved, and no evidence of
such was presented in the record or cited by Justice Douglas." ' It is not hard to
constitutional per se or that there is no system of capital punishment that would comport
with 0 3the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 310-11.
'
Id. at 313.
0
4l Id.at 242.
'mBrief.for Petitioner at 14-17, Jackson v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Brief for
Petitioner at 19-23, Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
... Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
132, 141 (1969).
07408 U.S. at 257.
...
Although Justice Douglas found "the idea of equal protection of the laws . . . implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments," id. at 257, and Justice Powell considered the issues raised by the eighth and fourteenth amendments "essentially the same,"
id. at 429, it may well be asked at this point whether the claim of discrimination under the
eighth amendment carries a lesser burden of proof than a like claim under the fourteenth
amendment. The punishment statutes involved in Furman were certainly fair on their faces.
If administered unequally, however, such statutes may still violate equal protection guaranties
under the Constitution. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886). The Supreme
Court has held that there is no such violation "unless there is shown to be present in [the
administration of the statute] an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination."
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) (emphasis added). Several courts have refused
to take judicial notice of the type of statistical evidence used in Furman to raise the question
of a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny, since such evidence does not serve to

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2 7

believe that there is some obvious truth in the statistics, but it is a giant step

from such belief to any further claims of their universal veracity. The application of this evidence to Furman especially, but also to Jackson and Branch,
goes even another step further.
Justice Douglas' claimed discrimination aside, the total lack of any discernible, rational standards for the infrequent, discretionary imposition of the

death penalty still remained troublesome to Justices White and Stewart. Statutes
of the federal government and forty states prescribed death for many different
crimes.' Yet in the ten years 1961-1970 only 1,057 death sentences were
imposed and only 135 were carried out.1 ' Justices White and Stewart argued
that the constitutional meaning of "unusual" comprehended this established
irregularity and infrequency, and, thus, the statutes from which these ills arose
violated the eighth amendment. Among such statutes were those of Georgia
and Texas under which petitioners had been sentenced.
This conclusion, however, seems fundamentally at odds with the Court's
decision only one year before in McGautha v. California,"' in which Justices
White and Stewart had concurred. In that case McGautha had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. California law vested in the sentencing jury
standardless discretion for imposing the death penalty in murder cases. In so
doing the legislature no longer had to prescribe sentences to be applied across
the board for a given crime regardless of any mitigating considerations presented in a particular case. Instead, the law left the choice between life imprisonment and death to the jury, subject only to the condition that their
decision be unanimous. What had thus been lauded as a great advance in
penology was attacked by McGautha as a deprivation of life without due
process of law. Faced with the possible alternative of a mandatory death penshow intent or purpose in the given situation. See Florida ex fel. Thomas v. Culver, 253
F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1958); Rudolph v. State, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963); Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 533, 159 S.E.2d
611 (1968). But a recent decision by the Fifth Circuit en banc declared proof of intent
unnecessary and instead relied on statistical evidence to raise the suspect classification question. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Note, Equal
Protection and Municipal Services, 25 Sw. L.J. 758 (1971). Even under the more relaxed
requirements of Hawkins, the acceptance in Furman of particularly weak and unconvincing
statistics as demonstrative of a suspect classification may stretch the concepts of numerical
and proportional equality beyond their limits. See Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1165-66 (1969). Justice Douglas' ready acceptance of
the statistical evidence in Furman as proof of an eighth amendment violation would hardly
seem to comport with the cautious recognition of such evidence elsewhere under the fourteenth amendment.
Aside from evidentiary difficulties, the problem of state action remains. In Furman the
state action is obviously jury sentencing. An attack on such action involves a slap at the
entire jury system. As the Chief Justice pointed out, "[Tlo assume from the mere fact of
relative infrequency that only a random assortment of pariahs are sentenced to death, is to
cast grave doubt on the basic integrity of our jury system." 408 U.S. at 388-89 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Douglas' treatment of the eighth amendment would seem to extend the arm of the fourteenth amendment equal protection beyond the jury sentence to
reach the substantive considerations of the jury always before held inviolate, and this on
the basis of weak statistical evidence unrelated to the particular cases before the court. See
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303,
312-13 (1899).
"0 See Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics, No. 46, Capital Punishment
1930-1970, at 50. At the time of the decision the California Supreme Court had abolished
the death penalty in that state. See part III supra. But see note 87 supra.
11 Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics, No. 40, at 9.
l11402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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alty for a broad and inadequately defined crime, the Court expressed its confidence in the jury system. "In light of history, experience, and the present
limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life
or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. The States
are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the
consequences of their decision. .

,,1"

Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall

dissented.
The Furman Court varied in their views of McGautha. Justice Marshall
totally ignored it; Justice White alluded to it only indirectly and then not
by name; Justice Stewart distinguished it as not having presented an eighth
amendment question. For Justices Douglas and Brennan and the four dissenters McGautha was a central issue. It is submitted that the real effect of
Furman on McGautha depends on a fine distinction not clearly drawn by any
of the Justices. The judgment in McGautha upheld discretionary sentencing
only and did not address the question of capital punishment. No relation between the two issues is immediately apparent. If, however, the death penalty
is cruel and unusual because it is imposed arbitrarily,then the issues are the
same, and McGautha would seem to be overruled. Furman would strike down
an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty as being violative of the eighth
amendment, contrary to the decision in McGautha based on the fourteenth
amendment. On the other hand, if the death penalty is cruel and unusual because it is imposed infrequently, then the procedure for imposition would be
irrelevant. The constitutionality of the penalty would then turn not on the
legal question of arbitrariness as proper procedure, but rather on the fact
question of how many times the death penalty is imposed. A statute carrying
a mandatory death sentence would escape the fault of arbitrariness at the price
of returning to an insensitive penology. It might also result in the more frequent imposition of death. But such a statute, even if limited to the most carefully defined, most extraordinary, most heinous crime, would fall if applied
infrequently. If infrequency implies unusualness, then the constitutional defect
is absolutely fatal. Only by imposing capital punishment in a multitude of
cases could the defect be avoided, and in such an unlikely event the defect of
unusualness would be replaced by the charge of excessiveness and unconstitutional cruelty.
While the rule of stare decisis is not binding on the Supreme Court, the
overturning of a case decided only a year before hardly adds to the stability
of the law. On the other hand, it would seem obvious that "[t~he punishment
of death is, doubtless, the most dreadful and the most impressive spectacle of
public justice; and it is not possible to adopt any other punishment equally
powerful by its example. It ought to be confined to the few cases of the most
atrocious character, for it is only in such cases that public opinion will warrant
the measure, or the peace and safety of society require it."11 It is, thus, some11

Id. at 207-08.

11

2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 14 (13th ed. 1884).
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what anomalous to find fault with the infrequent imposition of a penalty which
ought to be imposed only in rare cases. In any case, neither arbitrariness nor
infrequency is closely related to the language, "cruel and unusual," or even to
"evolving standards of decency." Still more disturbing is the Court's failure in
nine separate opinions to deal with any of these problems in any meaningful
and comprehensive way. For Justice Marshall alone they are irrelevant. Justice
White faulted the death penalty for infrequent imposition, apparently dismissing out of hand the argument that it ought to be reserved for special cases.
Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Brennan faulted the penalty for both infrequent
and arbitrary imposition, Justice Stewart without discussing the effect on
McGautha, in which he had concurred. The current manner of imposition of
the death penalty seems on its face vulnerable to serious objections, and the
arguments urged in support of these objections by abolitionists are legion.""
But the attempts by the majority to marshall these arguments are mired in
confusion. Only the judgment itself is clear: the death penalty is today administered in a way that is violative of the eighth amendment.
C. The Dissent
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented from the judgments of the Court. Each wrote his own opinion, and each
joined the Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Rehnquist in their opinions.
Justice Blackmun was not joined by his brothers, perhaps because of the largely
personal nature of his comments and arguments. Presented with the opportunity to make a unified, carefully reasoned response to the majority, the dissenters seemed to lapse instead into the same confusion that plagued the majority. Five principal arguments emerged.
First, the dissenters argued that the majority had gone far beyond the straightforward meaning of "cruel and unusual." In the words of the Chief Justice:
"... I submit that the questions raised by the necessity approach are beyond
the pale of judicial inquiry under the Eighth Amendment.""' Justice Powell
argued that the eighth amendment did not make the Court the final arbiter of
the excessiveness of punishments unless blatantly harsh."" Neither conceded
mere infrequency to be a constitutional standard, and both pointed to the lack
of necessary connection between infrequency and arbitrariness and discrimination. In short, the objections of excessiveness, lack of necessity, arbitrariness,
and infrequency raised by the majority were simply not comprehended within
the meaning of "cruel and unusual." But this charge that the majority had
misread the Constitution, while the most serious, is the least meaningful. As
Justice Hughes once pointed out, the Constitution is what the judges say it is;...
indeed, it is what a majority says it is. The dissent's first argument amounts to
no more than the obvious: they interpreted the eighth amendment differently.
The second argument is much like the first. Accepting as the true eighth
amendment test the Trop "evolving standards of decency" test, all four Justices
"'For an excellent anthology, see H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
(1964).
113
408 U.S. at 396.
"'1d. at 433-34.
1171 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 204 (1951).
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claimed that the public's standards of decency have not evolved to the point
that they bar capital punishment. For the majority, the infrequent imposition
of the death penalty, the increased growth of the abolitionist movement, the

national and international trends toward abolition, the development of enlightened penological systems, all pointed to the societal rejection of the death

penalty. For the dissent, the retention of capital punishment in forty states and
the federal government, the continued imposition by juries having the discretion to choose a lesser sentence, the lack of meaningful statistics, all pointed

to a lack of change in society's standards of decency since the time of earlier
decisions such as Trop. Such a basic disagreement over facts does little to point

up illogicalities or inconsistencies in the majority's position. The upshot is
merely that four Justices would have found the facts otherwise.
The third argument, apparently underlying the first two, was that the majority had violated the legislative province. The dissent argued that matters of
penology and evaluations of standards of decency were not proper considerations for the Court at all, but were instead matters solely addressed to the
legislatures. The Chief Justice stated that the majority's determination of
standards of decency constituted a denial of the fact that "in a democracy the
legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of decency
prevailing in the society.","' In addition to abstract questions of power between
coordinate branches of government, Justice Rehnquist also noted that the possibility for error in such a grave matter was much higher among nine men
than among hundreds: "A separate reason for deference to the legislative
judgment is the consequence of human error on the part of the judiciary with
respect to the constitutional issue before it.""' "The sobering disadvantage of
constitutional adjudication of this magnitude," Justice Powell added, "is the
universality and permanence of the judgment.""' However, the dissent did not
deny that the eighth amendment was a proper basis for judicial review, only
that review was not proper in these cases. This question of degree, like the
questions of fact and constitutional interpretation, was in basic dispute.
The fourth argument presented the first real attack on the merits of the
majority's arguments. It was, quite simply, that the majority had overruled
McGautha without saying so and without discussing the reasons for doing so.
The Court, of course, is not bound by the principle of stare decisis, and the
Chief Justice quickly admitted this. "It may be thought appropriate to subordinate principles of stare decisis where the subject is as sensitive as capital
punishment and the stakes are so high, but these external considerations were
no less weighty last year."'' . The arguments to counter those accepted by a
six-man majority only one year before had gone unstated. McGautha, the
dissent charged, had been silenced.
"
As has already been seen,12
' however, McGautha has not necessarily been
overruled, despite the claims of the dissenters and Justices Douglas and
11408 U.S. at 384.
9 Id. at 468.
"O Id. at 462.
"I Id. at 400.
"mSee part III, section A supra.
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Brennan. While McGautha indeed presents a focal point of serious weakness
in the majority's opinions (except for Justice Marshall's), the dissenters failed
to capitalize on that fact. They, too, seemed to confuse arbitrariness with infrequency. The dissenters emphasized differences of opinion, allowing quite
serious flaws in the majority opinions to go unchallenged.
What pervades all four dissenting opinions is the fifth argument, best stated
by Justice Blackmun: "I fear the Court has overstepped.""' Justice Blackmun's
principal difficulty with the majority's judgments was "the suddenness of the
Court's perception of progress in the human attitude since decisions of only a
short while ago.""' Justice Powell spoke of the majority's action as "sweeping"
and recalled Justice Holmes' exhortation of judicial self-restraint. Justice
Rehnquist charged that the majority had even ceased to act as Justices, concluding "that this decision holding unconstitutional capital punishment is not
an act of judgment, but rather an act of will."' But by far the most serious
indictment came at the hand of Chief Justice Burger. "The five opinions in
support of the judgment differ in many respects, but they share a willingness
to make sweeping factual assertions, unsupported by empirical data, concerning
the manner of imposition and effectiveness of capital punishment in this
country.""
It is submitted that if the majority had really gone so far, reply to their
errors should have taken a form other than mere tirade. In fact, it would seem
that the dissenters fell prey to the same confusion that pervaded the majority
opinions. The judgment of the Court is clear; the opinions are not. The key
to the enigmatic arguments must be found in future decisions.
IV.

THE EFFECTS OF FURMAN

Furman has thus far posed two major practical questions: whether bail may
be denied in cases involving crimes previously carrying the death penalty, and
what procedures should be used to resentence prisoners on death row. An
additional theoretical question is presented: how capital punishment legislation
may be drafted to pass constitutional muster. All three questions will be discussed briefly with particular emphasis in the first two on Texas law.
A. Bail

Article I, section 11 of the Texas Constitution provides in part: "All
prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when
the proof is evident .
1.2.."7 As of 1970 the constitutions of at least thirtyseven states established the right to bail with language similar to that used in
the Texas Constitution."' A capital offense is defined in Texas as "[aln offense
for which the highest penalty is death."'2 9 The abolition of capital punishment
"'408
U.S. at 414.
1 MId. at 410.
11 Id. at 468.
1,67 Id. at 405.
' TEx. CONS'r. art. I, § 11. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.07 (1966) contains
a similar provision: "All prisoners shall be bailable unless for capital offenses when the
proof is evident."
"' See State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245, 248 (1972).
229 TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 47 (1961).
It has also been defined as a case or crime
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under Furman"'
raises the question of whether a prisoner charged with an
easily provable crime which, prior to Furman, might have carried the death
penalty, is bailable. Two arguments have been made.
Prior to Furman only one argument, the "definitional" argument, was accepted. It had been urged and adopted time and again in states whose legislatures had abolished the death penalty by statute without changing the phrasing
of the right to bail in the state constitution."' The constitutional language in
such instances, it is argued, is clear: bail is to be denied only in capital cases.
It was reasoned that the framers' concern was that a prisoner faced with the
prospect of forfeiting his life would much more likely forfeit whatever sureties
he had posted in order to escape the threat of conviction. Their concern extended only to those cases in which the death penalty would probably be

exacted, and the limitation thus imposed upon the fundamental right to bail
should be applied only in such cases. Because death can no longer be a penalty
for crime, the argument continues, there are no capital offenses. Therefore,
there are no cases in which bail can be denied.
The second argument, the "classification" argument, originated in a footnote
to the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Anderson.1 It reasons
that bail is excluded from a certain class of crimes. The death penalty is a
characteristic but not a prerequisite of the crimes in the class. The punishment
actually prescribed is incidental to the constitutional definition and not part
of the fundamental policy involved. Whether punished by death or not, certain
crimes, for example murder with malice, ought not to carry the right to bail.
"The underlying gravity of those offenses endures [beyond the abolition of
capital punishment] and the determination of their gravity for the purpose of
bail continues unaffected .... "13
Since Furman the definitional argument has been accepted in Texas. In
Ex parte Contella" appellants appealed from orders in habeas corpus proceedings refusing them bail after they had been charged with murder. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that "there is no case in which bail
may be denied under the provisions of Art. I, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution .... .""1 Citing Furman, the court pointed out that "Since the death
penalty may not be imposed, there no longer exists a 'capital felony' as defined
"in or for which death penalty may, but need not necessarily, be inflicted." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 263 (4th ed. 1957).
13While the precise extent of the ruling in Furman is uncertain, it is clear that the death
penalty is no longer available for most murder and rape statutes under which death is not
a mandatory sentence.
...
See In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 163 P. 264 (1917) (Arizona repealed the death
penalty between 1916 and 1918 only); Ex parte Bail, 106 Kan. 536, 188 P. 424 (1920);
State v. Pert, 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d 205 (1958); City of Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48
S.D. 378, 204 N.W. 999 (1925); In re Perry, 19 Wis. 676 (1865).
1 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 900 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 172 n.45,
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
133
Id.
1-485 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
133Id. at 912. On rehearing Judge Douglas found the questions presented by both appellants to be moot. The judgments of reversal were, therefore, set aside and the lower judgments affirmed. However, Judge Douglas noted, "Nothing [in the rehearing opinion) alters
the holding in the original opinion." Id. at 912 n.1.
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in Art. 47, V.A.P.C.""' This reasoning has also been followed in New Jersey 13'
and Pennsylvania." 8
The classification argument has been adopted by Colorado 3' and Louisiana'4
in addition to California. While the classification argument seems to provide
for the least upheaval as a result of the death penalty decisions in Furman
and Anderson, it also seems to contravene the plain language of the respective
constitutions involved. It is suggested that the better path is that taken by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, with constitutional change, if any, left to the
legislature and the people.
B. Resentencing
In abolishing capital punishment Furman is fully retroactive to convictions
under statutes subject to the same faults as those actually struck down. 4' This
aspect of the decision has proved extremely troublesome, requiring the high
courts of the several states to establish resentencing procedures."4 Conflicts
thus posed between due process and legal efficiency are commonly difficult to
resolve.
In some states resentencing procedure is dictated or provided for by statute.
In California, for example, the supreme court in People v. Anderson simply
modified Anderson's death sentence to life imprisonment, 4' establishing this
as the remedy for all prisoners then under the death sentence.'" Illinois law
requires that in any case in which the original sentence has been vacated, the
trial court must hold a "hearing in aggravation and mitigation," and after
hearing evidence, impose any sentence which the jury could have imposed at
the original trial.'4 The Illinois Supreme Court held this procedure applicable
to prisoners whose death sentences were overturned by Furman.'"
In the few instances in which a statute provides more than one alternative
to the death penalty, a new trial will be required, at least with regard to
sentencing. 4 " But where the only alternative to death is life imprisonment,
...
485 S.W.2d at 912.
' State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972).
"'Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829 (1972).
:People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court, 500 P.2d 358 (Colo. 1972).
'"State v. Flood, 269 So. 2d 212 (La. 1972). Louisiana has extended the classification
argument to apply to all procedural protections such as unanimous jury verdict and jury
sequestration provided by law for capital offenses. State v. Holmes, 269 So. 2d 207 (La.
1972).
14""Whatever uncertainties may hereafter surface, several of the consequences of today's
decision are unmistakably clear. . . . The Court's judgment removes the death sentences previously imposed on some 600 persons awaiting punishment in state and federal prisons
throughout
the country." 408 U.S. at 416-17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
4
" The retroactive decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), posed a
similar but not identical problem. Because Witherspoon attacked jury selection, a new trial
as to punishment was required in the cases to which the decision applied. The taint of capital punishment per se, however, is not so deeply rooted in the trial and may more readily
be purged.
4'California appellate courts are empowered by statute to "reduce the degree of the
offense or the punishment imposed." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1972).
'"The supreme court provided that "any prisoner now under a sentence of death, the
judgment as to which is final, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior
court inviting that court to modify its judgment [i.e., from death to life imprisonment)."
6 Cal. 3d at 657 n.45, 493 P.2d at 899 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171 n.45.
'0ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(o) (1969).
'4"People
v. Speck, 52 111.2d 284, 287 N.E.2d 699 (1972).
' 47 Huggins v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 327, 191 S.E.2d 734 (1972). Virginia law
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several courts have held that reformation, either at the trial court or at the
appellate court level, may be a matter of course. The supreme courts of
Pennsylvania 4. and Delaware.4 have themselves reformed death sentences in
this way. The Louisiana Supreme Court chose instead to set aside the death
sentence and remand to the trial court with instructions to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment."'
The situation in Texas has been unique. In attempting to deal with cases
remanded by the United States Supreme Court under Witherspoon, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was not empowered either to resentence or to remand for resentencing cases in which the death penalty had been
illegally assessed by a jury."' Until Whan v.. State.'. the only course left was
to reverse and remand for a new trial.' But in that case the court ruled that
the Governor's commutation of appellant's death sentence to life imprisonment
while the case was pending decision on remand from the United States
Supreme Court cured the Witherspoon defects. In light of the Governor's
commutation the court concluded that "the proper course to follow is to again
affirm the judgment of the trial court."' " Judge Onion urged in his dissent that
the Governor could not commute a sentence set aside by the United States
Supreme Court and, thus, no longer in existence."'
The situation in Texas after Furman was identical. After the death penalty
was abolished, the Governor commuted the sentences of all prisoners on death
row in Texas. Again over Judge Onion's dissent, the court held the commutations valid."' In sustaining this easy escape from the resentencing problems
currently faced by other states, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals completely ignored appellants' arguments for new trials based on due process.
Texas resentencing has thus been accomplished by fiat rather than by carefully
reasoned legal scheme.

C. Possibilities for a Constitutional Capital Punishment
Since there is no majority of the Court on the ultimate issue presented in
these cases, the future of capital punishment in this country has been left in
an uncertain limbo. Rather than providing a final and unambiguous answer
on the basic constitutional question, the collective impact of the majority's
punishes first-degree murder with death or imprisonment for any term not less than twenty
years nor more than life. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-22 (1960).
" Commonwealth v. Ross, 449 Pa. 103, 296 A.2d 629 (1972).
'.' State v. Johnson, 295 A.2d 741 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
"' State v. Franklin, 263 La. 344, 268 So. 2d 249 (1972). A novel twist to this disposition of the problem was presented in a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal district
court sitting in Alabama. That court held the imposition of the death penalty to have been
a purely clerical error which the state sentencing court could amend nunc pro tunc or on writ
of error coram nobis. Eaton v. Capps, 348 F. Supp. 237 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
"I Ocker v. State, 477 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
In485 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
1"'Harris v. State, 485 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Turner v. State, 485
S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). On rehearing of both cases the court took notice of
the Governor's subsequent commutations and, following Whan, affirmed the decisions of
the lower courts.
15-485 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
"5 Quintana v. State, 485 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See also note 130 supra.
The logical appeal of Judge Onion's dissent notwithstanding, the court adopted the procedure established in Whan in the Witherspoon cases that followed.
" Stanley v. State, 490 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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ruling is to demand an undetermined measure of change from the various
state legislatures and the Congress. While I cannot endorse the process of
decisionmaking that has yielded today's result and the restraints which that
result imposes on legislative action, I am not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have been given the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital
punishment. If today's opinions demonstrate nothing else, they starkly show
that this is an area where legislatures can act far more effectively than courts."'
Recognizing the quandary in which state legislatures would find themselves
after Furman, the Chief Justice endeavored in his dissent to provide certain
guidelines for change. The demise of capital punishment is not absolute:
"Today the Court has not ruled that capital punishment is per se violative of
the Eighth Amendment; nor has it ruled that the punishment is barred for
any particular class or classes of crimes.""'n For those legislatures convinced of
the efficacy of the death penalty some latitude remains for action. The twofold
problem then becomes to find the constitutional loophole and to draft statutes
accordingly.
For the Chief Justice the loophole was clear: "[I1f the legislatures are to
continue to authorize capital punishment for some crimes, juries and judges
can no longer be permitted to make the sentencing determination in the same
manner they have in the past."'19 The Chief Justice saw as the main objection
of the majority the lack of evenhanded justice in the discretionary imposition
of the death penalty. If this is in fact the case, then the simple cure is to remove
from the hands of sentencing judges and juries the discretion to impose death.
This can be effected in two ways.
In the first place, some discretion may be reposed in the sentencing judges
and juries if carefully defined standards are provided by the legislatures. "Since
the two pivotal concurring opinions [those of Justices Stewart and White] turn
on the assumption that the punishment of death is now meted out in a random
and unpredictable manner, legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws into
compliance with the Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and
judges to follow in determining the sentence in capital cases .

. . .""

Under

this option only sentencing statutes and not statutes actually defining crimes
would require alteration. The legislature would be required to set out the
considerations upon which the determination of sentence would turn. Possible examples would be prior criminal record, attitude toward the crime committed, rehabilitative potentialities, etc. Such standards and evidence thereof
would have to be detailed and precise. The possibility that a legislature could
make such an exhaustive and detailed statement is slight.
But equally slight is the alternative. Arbitrariness could be eliminated by
making death mandatory for certain narrowly defined crimes. Under this
option a legislature would have to rewrite sentencing statutes to require death
in all cases in which a conviction is obtained. Only by acquittal could the imposition of death be avoided. For example, it would then be necessary to specify
408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 396.
9
I'
1d.
at 397.
160Id. at 400.
'5

118

COMMENTS

1973]

the exact elements of murder with malice or rape with threat of grievous
bodily injury. It is perhaps impossible for a legislative body to make such a
priori definitions of crimes. At least the Court in McGautha was convinced
that such specificity had never been achieved.' 6'
Accordingly, the loophole indicated by the Chief Justice is small indeed. In
fact, it may be nonexistent. The Chief Justice emphasized arbitrariness as the
primary fault of capital punishment found by the majority, and dismissed as
"ironical" the infrequency argument. Obviously the majority did not call for
the death sentence in more cases. But if infrequency of imposition implies
societal rejection of the penalty, and, thus, constitutional unusualness, then
arbitrariness as an abuse of discretion in sentencing is irrelevant."' The implication is weak; but it cannot be dismissed as a matter of course. Despite the
Chief Justice's advice, no easy escape from Furman is clear from the majority

opinions.
At least one state has followed Chief Justice Burger's advice. Delaware law
imposes death as the mandatory penalty for murder in the first degree."' In a
separate statute allowance is made for reduction in sentence if the jury recommends mercy.' The Delaware Supreme Court has held that Furmanoverruled
the latter statute but not the former.' Therefore, "the mandatory death provision of the Murder Statute, standing alone, will not constitute 'cruel and
unusual' punishment in violation of the constitutional guaranties."'6 6 In the
future all persons found guilty of first degree murder in Delaware will automatically be sentenced to death.
V. CONCLUSION

And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast
will I require it, and at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life
of a man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for
in the image of God made he man.'
Since before the age of Noah, from our earliest recollections, death has been
used as punishment for crime. As recently as 1819 the number of capital
crimes in England was estimated to be 223.68 From 1805 to 1810 between
two and three thousand people were executed there each year."6 Death was
acknowledged as a punishment for crime by the framers of the American
161 "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language
which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks
which are beyond present human ability." 402 U.S. at 204.

161See part III, section B supra.
6'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 571

(1953).

1645d. S 3901.
165 State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1972). The court held that the
murder statute was separable from the mercy statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 308 (1953).
'"State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761, 768 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1972). The court rejected all
arguments that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se.
"7Genesis 9: 5-6.
'H' {. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 1-2 (Anchor Books ed. 1964).
61
1d.,
I citing L. RADZINowIcz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 3-5, 153

(1948).
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Constitution.' ° In the last twelve years Congress has passed three new laws
requiring the death penalty. 7' Throughout this entire period, especially in the
last hundred years, the abolitionist movement has grown markedly, but the
history of capital punishment is one of continuous, uninterrupted use.
Arguments from the past-"it has always been done in this way"-must
fall in the face of enlightened concepts of the future, for man is free to develop
new and better means of living and working. He depends on, but is not limited
to, the teachings of history. So the science of penology is an evolving one, and
the cruelty and unusualness of punishments against which the Constitution
stands are to be interpreted under the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."''
At the same time, the experience of six thousand years cannot lightly be
disregarded, and it is far from clear that it in fact has been. Chief Justice
Warren looked hard for evidence of popular moral rejection of capital punishment but found none.' Fourteen years later and just prior to the decision in
Furman a national poll indicated that fifty percent of the country favors the
death penalty for murder while forty-one percent does not. 4 Slightly over four
months after Furman was handed down the citizens of California, undeterred
by the opinions of the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme
Court, passed by a two-to-one margin an amendment to the California Constitution reinstating the death penalty.'" The Delaware Supreme Court has
refused to find its state's death penalty unconstitutional."' And in Florida the
House Death Penalty Committee recently approved a bill that would make
mandatory the death penalty for premeditated murders, rape of a child under
the age of thirteen, bomb-killings, and kidnappings which result in the death
of the victim.'"
Society's standards of decency cannot be created ex nihilo by adjudication
or legislation. If such standards be indeed the touchstone of the eighth amendment, then we must wait for evolution to run its course.

10 For example, U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that "No person shall . . . be deprived
of life . . . without due process of law .... "
'Aircraft Piracy Statute, 49 U.S.C. S 1472(i) (1970) (enacted 1961); Presidential
Assassination Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1970) (enacted 1965); Congressional Assassination Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1970) (enacted 1971).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
17s Id. at 99.
' N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1972, at 29, col. 3.
'7 See note 87 supra.
'State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1972).
'77 12 CRIM. L. REP. 2216 (1972).

